Not according to the

Maverick Philosopher, who

writes:

1. Let S = *Something exists* and N = *Nothing exists*.

2. If N is possibly true, then S, which is true, and known to be true, is only contingently true.

Therefore

3. There are possible worlds in which S is false and possible worlds in which S is true. (By defn. of 'contingently true')

4. In the worlds in which S is true, something exists.

5. In the worlds in which S is false, it is also the case that something exists, namely, S. (For an item cannot have a property unless it exists, and so S cannot have the property of being false unless S exists)

Therefore

6. There is no possible world in which nothing exists.

Therefore

7. N is not possibly true, and necessarily something exists.

I think the Maverick slipped a fast one by us. Let's try it my way:

1. Let S = *Something exists* and N = *Nothing exists*.

2. If N is possibly true, then S, which is true, and known to be true, is only contingently true.

3. Where N is possibly true, S must be false.

Therefore

4. There are possible worlds in which S is false and possible worlds in which S is true. (By defn. of 'contingently true')

5. In the possible worlds in which S is true, something exists.

6. In the possible worlds in which S is false, it is the case that nothing exists, because N is true where S is false. (For an item cannot have a property unless it exists, and so S cannot have the property of being true where N is true, because something cannot exist where nothing exists.)

Therefore

7. There is a possible world in which nothing exists.

Therefore

8. N is possibly true in a world that exists apart from our world, in which S is true.

My conclusion: "Nothing" is logically possible, but we can never experience it because (a) we live in a world where there is "something," (b) it is impossible to live in a world where there is "nothing," and (c) it is impossible to experience "nothing." Therefore, a world of "nothing" is nothing more than a logically possible fantasy.